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THIS ARTICLE EXAMINES THE CURRENT SECTAR-
IANIZATION OF THE MIDDLE EAST. IT BEGINS 
WITH A CONCEPTUALIZATION OF SECTARIAN-
ISM, DISTINGUISHES KINDS OF SECTARIANISM 
AND EXAMINES THE FACTORS THAT DETERMINE 
WHICH VERSIONS OF SECTARIANISM DOMI-
NATE AT A PARTICULAR TIME. IT SURVEYS THE 
PRECONDITIONS OF SECTARIANIZATION – UN-
EQUAL MODERNIZATION, INSTRUMENTALIZA-
TION OF IDENTITY IN REGIME POWER-BUILDING 
PRACTICES; THE INITIAL PRECIPITANT OF SEC-
TARIANIZATION, THE US INVASION OF IRAQ; 
AND THE IMPACT OF THE ARAB UPRISINGS, IN 
WHICH SECTARIANISM WAS INSTRUMENTAL-
IZED BY REGIMES AND OPPOSITIONS. INSTRU-
MENTALIZED SECTARIANISM REACHED THE 
GRASSROOTS AND WAS TRANSMUTED INTO 
MILITANT SECTARIANISM BY THE SECURITY DI-
LEMMA, COMPETITIVE INTERFERENCE IN FAILED 
STATES, AND TRANS-STATE DIFFUSION OF SEC-
TARIAN DISCOURSES. THE CONSEQUENCES OF 
The Sectarian 
Revolution  i n  t h e  M i d d le  East
abstract
R ay m o n d  H i n n e b u s c h keywords
SECTARIANIZATION INCLUDE ITS CHALLENGE TO STATE 
FORMATION AND ITS TENDENCY TO EMPOWER AUTHOR-
ITARIANISM. CIVIL WAR HAS UNLEASHED MILITANT SEC-
TARIANISM LEADING TO EXCLUSIVIST PRACTICES AMONG 
BOTH REGIMES AND OPPOSITION. THE REGIONAL POWER 
STRUGGLE HAS TAKEN THE FORM OF SECTARIAN BI-PO-
LARIZATION BETWEEN SUNNI AND SHIA CAMPS. SECTAR-
IANIZATION CAN ONLY BE REVERSED BY AN END TO THE 
CURRENT CIVIL WARS IN SYRIA , IRAQ AND YEMEN AND 
THE REGIONAL POWER STRUGGLES THAT KEEP THEM GO-
ING. 
SECTARIANISM, ARAB UPRISINGS, FAILED STATES,  
CIVIL WAR, REGIONAL POWER STRUGGLE, SUNNI, SHIA 
  INTRODUCTION
There is a wide consensus that the Middle East is in the grip of 
a sectarian wave, despite much disagreement about its dimensions, 
causes and consequences. While sectarianism has always been an 
element of the MENA cultural fabric, the recent surge of politicized and 
militant sectarianism and the bi-polarization between Sunni and Shia 
is unprecedented in the modern history of the region. Not only has it 
introduced virulent and violent practices into inter-state competition, 
but it is also fracturing multi-sectarian states across the region and re-
empowering authoritarian forms of governance.1 
Insofar as it has transformed pre-existing power structures, then the 
sectarian surge in MENA has a revolutionary dimension: identities have 
undergone significant and rapid change; an unprecedented number of 
states have failed, relatively empowering trans-state movements; the 
balance of power among states has been radically upset; and state borders 
are being challenged. In other respects, however, sectarianism has been 
a vehicle of counter-revolution that has blocked the transformation of 
the region envisioned by those who launched the Arab Uprisings starting 
in 2010. The Middle East looks, in many respects, entirely different than 
before this sectarian surge; but the outcome is an Arab winter, not an 
Arab spring 
This paper will seek to explain the sectarian phenomenon, particularly 
its rapid diffusion across the region, and to analyze its impact on the 
1  Gause 2014; Salloukh 2015. 
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stability of fragile states, its implications for forms of governance and its 
effect on the regional power struggle and the stability of the regional states 
system. 
  CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK: THINKING ABOUT 
  SECTARIANISM
Sectarianism has two characteristics, an identity, perhaps political, 
which defines a community to which individuals belong and normative 
prescriptions, that is, the norms and roles attached to the identity. 
1) Identity: Multiple & Constructed
Thinking about the construction of sectarianism as an identity usefully 
departs from the debates over political identity between primordialists, 
modernists, and instrumentalists. Since primordialists focus on the 
historical roots of identities, modernism focuses on contemporary 
structural context and instrumentalists on agency, an adequate approach 
needs to combine the insights of each. From such a synthesis, it is possible 
to derive a number of starting points.2
First, political identity is plastic, not fixed or unchanging. Yet, identities 
cannot be arbitrarily invented, for, as primordialists insist, their credibility 
and popular resonance depends on memories of long historical experience 
and inherited shared ingredients such as language, which are only 
constructed over the longue durée; once constructed, identity becomes 
a durable ‘social fact,’ part of structure which constrains agency. Moreover, 
as people are born into an identity – such as sect – it is primordial, appearing 
‘natural,’ ‘everyday’ and ‘banal,’ even though it must be continually 
reproduced by early socialization, kin, peer groups, schools, religious 
institutions, etc. 
Vali Nasr remarks that “how you pray decides who you are”3 but, in fact, 
religion is only one factor in MENA peoples’ identity. Indeed, there are, 
especially in the Middle East, multiple credible identities, located at different 
‘levels:’ some are small, particularistic and exclusivistic (family, tribe); others 
define larger more universalistic and inclusive identities (the state, supra-
state (Arabism, Pan-Islam). Sect is therefore only one such identity, located 
somewhere between the two poles and, as such, by no means inevitably 
dominant. Also, people may hold several identities simultaneously perhaps 
because some are not politicized or because they overlap in content, being 
2  The following section builds on and synthesizes material from the analyses in: Matthieson 
2015: Chapter 1; Varshney 2007; Malmvig 2012; Hinnebusch 2016a.  
3  POMED 2012. 
compatible in their norms; thus, people may simultaneously identify with 
their sect, their state and a larger Arab or Islamic community. For example, 
as long as their sectarian identity remained banal and unpoliticized, 
educated Shia in Lebanon and Iraq were often communists and Sunnis 
and Christians in Syria were Arab nationalists. With many identities in 
competition, their salience alters over time, a product of the practices of 
political entrepreneurs and structural conditions, as instrumentalists and 
modernists demonstrate. 
2) Sectarian Variations
Sectarianism is not a homogeneous phenomenon, but rather varies 
according to levels of politicization and intensity.4 Sectarianism is an 
identity marker combined with norms but the balance between these 
components makes for differences in its intensity, producing at least three 
major variants, banal, instrumentalized and militant sectarianisms. 
Everyday (or banal) sectarianism is a relatively un-politicized identity 
marker in multi-sectarian societies, operative largely at the local level, 
with few national normative implications and therefore compatible 
with sectarian co-existence and with state and supra-state identities 
(e.g. Arabism). 
Instrumentalized sectarianism – The first step toward sectarianization 
is the politicization of sectarian differences for instrumental 
ends: political entrepreneurs are incentivized to instrumentalize 
sectarianism to mobilize sects in intra-state competition over 
resources, as famously in Lebanon, and individuals to use sectarianism 
to gain access to clientele networks. This ‘instrumental sectarianism’ 
has little doctrinal implications or necessary incompatibility with 
sectarian coexistence. Instrumentalism does not to imply that 
identities are merely tools in struggles over material resources for 
if identities reflect the interests of those who construct them, once 
constructed identity shapes conceptions of interests by those who 
hold to them and identity is an ideational interest in its own right 
that people will defend when under threat; thus in times of high 
insecurity, instrumental sectarianism facilitates defensive collective 
action (e.g. the minorities in the Syrian civil war).5  
Militant sectarianism – in the Muslim world jihadism – has an intense 
normative content, seeks to impose (universalize), if need be by 
force, a one true interpretation of religion – usually a fundamentalist 
one – in the public sphere; it demonizes those who do not comply 
as infidels and often embraces martyrdom for the cause. The main 
4  Haddad 2011. 
5  Malmvig 2012. 
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indicator of militant sectarianism is the denunciation of the other as 
an unbeliever, liable to persecution – takfir or the process of declaring 
others non-believers. Unlike an instrumentalist pursuit of material 
goods, which can be compromised by adjusting shares among the 
contenders, a public religious vision cannot readily be compromised. 
It should be stressed that this last form of sectarianism – jihadism 
– with its revolutionary dimension, has been a distinctly minority 
variant of Islam. Most variants of Islam are non-political (such as 
Sufism) and jihadism has to be distinguished from other kinds 
of political Islam, such as Salafism (especially its Saudi exported 
version Wahhabism), a highly fundamentalist variant that is often 
deferent to authority, and the modernist Muslim Brotherhood 
which is both more tolerant and open to ijtihad (reinterpretation). 
Militant sectarianism flourishes amongst intense power struggles 
and insecurity, particularly that fostered by civil war and state failure 
and is often promoted across boundaries by trans-state movements 
and discourses; under these conditions mainstream Islam tends to 
be on the defensive and other varieties of political Islam, especially 
Salafism, can mutate into jihadism.6 Sectarianism of this variety is 
a particularly powerful identity in that it tightly combines a sub-
state particularistic identity (where people are “born into” a sect at 
the ‘grassroots’) with the supra/or trans-state level in which states, 
movements and networks seek to mobilize supporters and de-
legitimize rivals via a universalizing discourse. 
3) The Determinants of Identity: Agency-Structure Interaction 
Identity change or reproduction is promoted by ‘political entrepreneurs’ 
motivated by power and ideology, as instrumentalists argue. Agency is 
most empowered in periods when several identities are competing, as is 
typical of the modern Middle East where no one identity has achieved 
hegemony for long; entrepreneurs, have, in this situation, more potential 
to politicize unpoliticized primordial identities and to shift dominant 
identities from one level to the other. However, the power of a particular 
identity depends on its congruence with material conditions, which 
encourage some identities and discourage others; thus, modernists would 
argue that broadened mass identities, such as identification with the 
state, are enabled by modernization; whether state builders practices are 
inclusive or exclusive, will affect whether people identify with the state; 
and in periods when material conditions are fluid, such as revolutions, 
collective action by identity movements can further change identities, as in 
the rise of jihadist movements in the Syrian civil war. In summary, which, 
6  Brubaker 2015. 
among several credible identities dominates at a given time and situation 
depends on a complex interaction of structure and agency. Departing from 
this viewpoint, explanations for the unprecedented sectarian surge of the 
contemporary period are attempted in the following section.
  DRIVERS OF SECTARIANIZATION 
Scholars have long recognized the exceptional power of identity in the 
Middle East and the permeability of regional states to trans-state identity 
discourses.7 Barnett and Lynch argued that identity is shaped by discourse 
competition in a trans-state public space;8 in the regional states system 
rival states bid for hegemony using trans-state discourses;9 and the main 
threats against which many regimes balance has not been from armies but 
ideational subversion challenging their domestic legitimacy.10 After several 
decades of post-independence Pan-Arab hegemony in the Arab world, oil-
bolstered states appeared to be consolidated and less permeable to trans-
state identities for a period peaking in the 1980s; but this proved ephemeral 
and what Salloukh called “the return of the weak state” – indeed failing 
states have re-empowered identity wars.11 Yet, if identity has always more 
or less mattered for regional politics, the identities instrumentalized in this 
rivalry have hitherto chiefly been inclusive state, Pan-Arab or Pan-Islamic 
identities. Now, however rival states and movements exploit the highly 
divisive sectarian dichotomy between Sunni and Shia. What explains the 
rapid diffusion and apparent hegemony of sectarian discourse and practices 
across the region? Several tendencies, each of which, in themselves, cannot 
explain it, and each of which contains counter tendencies, nevertheless 
when cumulative and combined, have constituted powerful drivers of 
sectarianism. 
1) Pre-Conditions of the Sectarian Surge
Modernization – social mobilization (education, mobility, market 
integration) driven by capitalist development tends to broaden identities 
toward the state level, while capitalism also drives class formation and class 
7  Salloukh, Brynen 2004. 
8  Barnett 1993; Lynch 1999. 
9  Kienle 1990: 1-30. 
10  Gause 2003/04; Rubin 2014. 
11  Salloukh 2016. 
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identity that may compete with more particularistic sub-state identities.12 
Yet because, in transition societies, modernization also greatly increases 
aspirations and competition for scarce resources, it can have the opposite 
effect: migrants to the city may broaden their identity from village (where 
sectarianism may be banal) to a larger sectarian community (of an activist 
instrumentalist kind) without it further extending to the nation-state 
and sectarian solidarity may become a vehicle for competition for scarce 
resources.13 Where resources are distributed by the state via clientele 
networks this effect is amplified; the instrumentalization of sectarianism 
is facilitated by its utility for overcoming the collective action problem 
thereby allowing people to organize for more effective competition over 
scare resources. Where increased supply scarcity intensifies competition, 
communal solidarity is further amplified. In the Middle East job creation 
has been lagging behind large increases in education, hence frustrating 
aspirations among youth. Massive population growth (in rural areas on 
fairly fixed land resources), fueling  large-scale urbanization, was also 
typical, aggravated in the case of Syria by an unprecedented drought. Finally, 
the greatly increased inequality in the distribution of wealth resulting from 
the global move to neo-liberalism, reflected in MENA by the move from 
populist to post-populist authoritarianism,14 greatly exacerbates communal 
tensions.15 In such conditions, losers often attribute outcomes to sectarian 
discrimination, raising sectarian consciousness – what we might call 
‘aggrieved sectarianism.’ 
Power building practices – Sectarianism’s use as part of authoritarian 
regime building in MENA’s multi-sectarian societies further politicized 
it. In such identity-divided societies latent primordial identities, notably 
sectarianism, seem ‘ready-made’ for exploitation in power struggles. 
Ruling politicians have a strong incentive to instrumentalize sectarian 
asayibbya to construct their power bases and oppositions are incentivized 
to use a counter-sectarian identity to mobilize support against the rulers. 
Thus, patrimonial practices, such as reliance on trusted sectarians, were 
used to foster cohesive ruling groups in Ba’thist Syria and Iraq. However, 
this was initially balanced by cross-sectarian co-optation of wider social 
forces, via bureaucratic institutions. These authoritarian regimes both used 
and contained sectarianism; this helps explain their remarkably durable 
rule over fragmented societies. Conversely, when the balance between 
patrimonial practices and inclusion through bureaucratic practices tilts 
toward the former, the excluded may feel themselves victims of sectarian 
discrimination (‘aggrieved sectarianism’), hence, tend to embrace 
a sectarian counter-identity. However, as long as state governance remains 
12  Deutsch 1961; Hobsbaum 1990. 
13  Nagel, Olzak 1982. 
14  Hinnebusch 2015b. 
15  Prasch 2012. 
intact, grievances take the form of grumbling and competition centers on 
wasta (clientele connections), not violence; it is state failure that paves the 
way for instrumental sectarianism to become militant and violent. State 
failure was, however, by no means inevitable: the region’s neo-patrimonial 
states seemed self-reproducing and it required external intervention to 
catalyze their de-stabilization. 
2) Precipitating the Sectarian Struggle: Global Intrusion 
The current sectarianization is a recent phenomenon precipitated by the 
unprecedented intrusion of the US global hegemon into the regional power 
struggle. The destruction of the Iraqi state amidst massive violence (shock 
and awe) unleashed Sunni-Shia civil war in Iraq. The US constructed 
a replacement political system that institutionalized instrumental 
sectarianism. The invasion also opened the door for intense penetration 
of Iraq by Iranian backed Iraqi Shia exiles and for international jihadists, 
including al-Qaida, to stir up sectarianism (by targeting Shia mosques) 
– an unprecedented transnationalization of sectarian conflict. The Iraq 
conflict spilled over in the region by stimulating sectarian discourse in the 
Iraqi and the trans-state media.16 
It also precipitated the so-called “New Arab Cold War” pitting the Sunni 
moderate states aligned with the US in spite of their opposition to the 
invasion against those that overtly opposed it – the Resistance Axis. The 
Sunni states, alarmed that the overthrown of the Sunni Saddam regime had 
allowed Iran to penetrate Iraq through allied Shia parties that had ridden 
to power on the back of a Shia majority and also by the growing power 
of Shia Hizbollah in Lebanon, deployed overt sectarian discourse against 
what they saw as Iran’s encroachment in Arab affairs. King Abdullah of 
Jordan famously warned of a “Shia Crescent.” Despite this, sectarianism 
found little resonance on the Arab street where Nasrallah, Assad and 
Ahmadinejad were the most popular regional leaders – for their resistance 
to what was still seen as the main enemy – Israel.17 So what turned this 
elite level instrumentalization of sectarian discourse into a much more 
dangerous grassroots sectarianism?
  
16  Dodge 2014; Al-Rawi 2013; Byman 2014; Al-Qarawee 2014. 
17  Valbjorn, Bank 2011. 
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3) The Arab Uprising: From Instrumental Sectarianism to Grassroots 
Sectarianization 
The Arab Uprising further intensified the struggle for power inside and 
among states, thereby unleashing the sectarian demon. To be sure, few of 
the protestors that launched the uprisings instrumentalized sectarianism; 
rather, the discourse of the youthful middle class protestors who dominated 
the early period of the uprisings stressed non-violence and cross-sectarian 
appeal – in a bid to neutralize regimes’ sectarian divide-and-rule tactics 
and also to get Western support by advertising their liberal credentials. 
In sectarian divided states like Syria, there were plenty of covert sectarian 
grievances operative and the protestors demand for equal citizenship 
conveyed resentment of what was perceived as the regime’s sectarian 
discrimination. Still, the uprisings were everywhere chiefly driven by 
socio-economic and political grievances notably associated by the move 
to post-populism and the frustration of expectations that economic 
liberalization would be paralleled by political opening. In the more identity-
homogeneous states, this tended to shape mobilization along class lines 
and to enable broad cross-class anti-regime coalitions (with both workers 
and the middle class joining against the regime), which in Tunisia and 
Egypt were sufficient to marginalize relatively minor sectarian differences 
and sweep presidents out of office. In highly identity-fragmented societies, 
such as Syria, differential distribution of costs and benefits from post-
populist crony capitalism were interpreted as sectarian discrimination; 
hence sectarian and class cleavages reinforced each other among the main 
victims, politically-unconnected small businessmen in the medium towns 
and the rural underclass. However, at the same time, sectarian cleavages 
cut across and diluted anti-regime mobilization, with significant societal 
segments declining to join the uprising or aligning with the regime, partly 
on class, partly sectarian lines. In Syria, there was enough mobilization 
against the regime to destabilize it but not for revolution from below, 
instead setting up the conditions for potential stalemate and civil war.
In this structural situation, the instrumentalism of sectarianism provided 
the tipping point into civil war. Even if non-violent, the flooding of the 
streets across the Arab world with mass protest that challenged regimes 
for control of public spaces, was a potent instrument in a struggle for 
power between counter-elites and ruling regimes, and particularly once 
protestors demanded the “fall of the regime” it was inevitable that regimes 
would fight back violently and with whatever tools were at their disposal. 
Unsurprisingly, once regimes were existentially challenged in Syria, Iraq 
and Bahrain, elites turned to sectarianism to consolidate their support 
bases, thereby provoking counter-sectarianism among oppositions. Rivals 
in power struggles ended up resorting to sectarianism, even if, as was 
often so, their own identities were not necessarily sectarian, because it 
was understood to work in mobilizing followers and demonizing enemies. 
Regimes framed the threat from the ‘Other’ in sectarian terms, oppositions 
then relied on militant sectarian discourse to mobilize fighters and fighting 
spirit (to make up for their usually inferior weaponry) and regimes were 
then pushed to rely more and more on defensive sectarian asabiyya. But what 
has made this elite and counter-elite instrumentalization of sectarianism, 
that for many years had failed to move the Arab street, so potent that it 
rapidly polarized the mass grass roots, increasing squeezing out all those 
in the middle? What had changed was the unprecedented wave of state 
failures unleashed by the uprisings inside several states – Iraq, Syria, Libya, 
Yemen – in which central governments lost their monopoly of legitimate 
violence to armed oppositions and lost control of swathes of territory as 
well as their ability to deliver security and services on which citizen loyalty 
was contingent.18
Internal drivers – Inside states, civil wars between forces that could be 
represented as ‘sectarian,’ during which unrestrained violence was deployed 
in a zero-sum power struggle, turned fighters on both sides to militant 
versions of sectarianism; the spilling of blood encouraging an embrace 
of religion. Jihadism intensified the violence as its adherents embraced 
martyrdom, e.g. suicide bombers. The ‘takfir-ization’ of the ‘Other’ deterred 
the compromises needed to stop the escalation of conflict. Second, the 
‘security dilemma’ pushed all sides to fall back on their communal group for 
protection;19 each group, seeing the other as a threat, acted pre-emptively 
to increase its own security in a way that made all less secure, by increasing 
group solidarity, demonization of the ‘Other,’ creation of sectarian militias 
and sectarian cleansing of neighborhoods. These practices entrenched 
sectarianism at the grassroots in Arab failed states. Many people have been 
permanently seared, especially youth whose political formation came in 
parallel to civil war, their identity transformed from inclusive to much 
more particularistic identities.
Third, the security dilemma was reinforced by the emergence of war 
economies: as normal economic life collapsed amidst civil war, people 
joined fighting factions that provided a minimum livelihood; since Gulf 
funding gave jihadist groups resource advantages over less sectarian 
ones, they were more successful in recruitment and, once incorporated, 
previously non-ideological recruits were subjected to intense socialization 
by the peer group. Thus, identities were further transformed in a sectarian 
direction and moderate, secular, middle forces weakened.
Fourth, once civil wars led to state failure, the territory of states became 
contested and divided up between warring patrimonial regime remnants 
18  Hinnebusch 2014; Byman 2014. 
19  Posen 1993. 
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and charismatic opposition movements, both drawing on the historically 
successful ‘Khaldounian’ practices – co-opting and sustaining loyalty or 
mobilizing followers on the basis of assabiyeh, some combination of blood 
kinship and shared religious vision – to build or sustain power. In multi-
sectarian societies this takes the form of sectarianism. The result is that 
regimes and counter-regimes become much more sectarian than had been 
the case when the uprisings first started.
External drivers – Simultaneously, internal conflicts in failed states not 
only spilled over to the regional level, but regional forces, at the same 
time, exacerbated sectarian conflict in individual states. Scholarship has 
shown that communal conflicts can be contagious, with kindred groups 
in several states that share grievances mobilized by a demonstration effect, 
and violent and successful insurgencies spreading readily across state 
boundaries.20 The shared culture, language, and in some cases, similar 
sectarian makeup, of the Arab states facilitates such spillover. But it was the 
widespread weakening of states in the Uprising that made them so much 
more permeable than hitherto to the diffusion of sectarianism by extensive 
transnational linkages – discourses of preachers, activist networks and 
armed movements. 
At the trans-state level, state weakening and civil war sectarianized 
discourse, and, specifically, the media. This began with Iraq’s 2003 de-
construction and was intensified by the uprisings, especially in Syria,21 
with highly sectarian discourses in the satellite and social media readily 
crossing borders, extremist narratives getting disproportionate attention 
and few voices pushing back against them.22 This trans-state transmission 
of sectarianism was not even limited to states with sectarian pluralism or 
civil war. Sectarianization has increased even in states where there is no 
civil war, few sectarian minorities and little external interference. Social 
media and radical preachers, particularly on Gulf-run Arab satellite TV, 
spread sectarian animosities far from states experiencing civil war. 
As sectarianism demonstratively seemed to “work” in mobilizing support 
and demonizing enemies, trans-state movements emulated each other in 
its exploitation. Notably in the Levant, the renewed permeability of states’ 
borders allowed Sunni Salafist jihadists to intervene on one side and 
a counter-coalition of Shia-led minorities (hilf al-aqalliyyat) on the other; 
militias from one country, recruited via long-distance sectarian networks, 
regularly transited to neighboring countries, while an unprecedented 
movement of foreign Muslim fighters poured into disputed states, 
altogether propelling an unprecedented transnationalization of opposing 
sectarian movements and networks. 
20  Lawson 2016. 
21  Byman 2014; Al-Rawi 2013. 
22  Lynch 2016b; Wehrey 2016. 
In parallel, where states failed, vacuums were created inviting competitive 
external intervention in which rival powers instrumentalized sectarian 
discourse and provided arms and financing to bring sectarian-affiliated 
allies to power in uprising states. As the rival regional powers backed the 
most sectarian factions – partly because they were the best fighters – the 
latter came to enjoy greater resources, precipitating a ‘bandwagoning’ of 
more “moderate” factions to the jihadist poles. Rival states emulated each 
other in what might be called “tit-for-tat sectarianism” – when one side 
frames the struggle in sectarian terms, its success leads its rivals to similarly 
respond.23 
 At the same time, at the regional level, the violence of civil wars combined 
with competition for leadership within sects promoted outbidding by 
radical sectarian entrepreneurs that marginalized moderates within each 
of the two main confessions. Within Sunnism the normative balance 
has shifted away from the previously majority non-violent versions that 
accepted co-existence, notably Sufis whose ‘everyday sectarianism’ was 
non-political and accommodationist with secular authorities and other 
sects. Sufism suffered from the rise of Salafist fundamentalism, which, 
particularly in failed states such as Syria, easily slipped into jihadism. At 
the same time, the modernists of the Muslim Brotherhood brand struggled 
to sustain their discourse on a civil state, squeezed between regimes’ 
repression and jihadi mobilization. Within Shiism, too, politicized militias, 
composed of zealots ready for martyrdom in defense of Shia shrines and 
neighborhoods, joined the fighting in Syria and Iraq. The rise of ISIS in 
Iraq provoked the mobilization of the overtly sectarian Shiite Hasht al-
Shaabi, which tended to elevate a trans-Shia identity over Iraqi national 
identity (which would embrace both Shia and Sunnis); Iran used the ISIS 
threat to encourage Iraqi Shia into joining such groups as these were its 
most reliable Iraqi clients.24 Yemen’s Zaidi identity, not hitherto anti-Sunni, 
took on a more Shia color amidst a civil war with Saudi backed Salafists. 
This stimulated a powerful cumulative tendency to bi-polarize the region 
between Sunni and Shia sectarianism in which the moderate secular 
center was compressed, if not squeezed out. This is not to say that this 
bi-polarization is uncontested or necessarily permanent. Class, local 
and tribal identities cross-cut sectarianism and civic identities compete 
with it. Neither Christians nor Kurds align with the two main sectarian 
camps. Both the “Sunni” and “Shia” camps are heterogeneous. There are 
social forces and moderate voices that have resisted sectarianization: Sufis, 
secular youth with a civic identity; modernist Islamists, Ayatollah Sistani 
in Iraq and Alawi dissidents who rejected the Syrian regime’s alliance with 
Iran. People have many identities and the embrace of militant sectarianism 
23  Wehrey 2016. 
24  Almarzoqi 2015. 
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is a function of the current violent conflicts and its instrumentalization in 
the regional power struggle. But as long as the fighting continues middle 
voices tend to be either disempowered or impelled to bandwagon with 
the radicals. The dynamics of violent conflict have shifted the normative 
balance within Islam away from co-existence and toward takfiri practices. 
Once let out, this deep sectarianism is very difficult to put back in the box.
Thus, similar structural factors (state failure, civil war) combined with trans-
state penetration and intervention made states and populations susceptible 
to unprecedented sectarian diffusion. What have the consequences of this 
been? One impact is a deleterious effect on both state cohesion and forms 
of governance.
  CONSEQUENCES OF SECTARIANIZATION
Sectarianism & State Formation/De-formation 
As Huntington famously said, the most important differences between 
countries is not the type of government but the amount of it, that is, their 
level of state formation.25 For him, state building proceeded through phases, 
first the concentration of power in an elite center; then an expansion of 
power through a single party that mobilized supporters, combined with 
reformism of the Ataturk type that forged a common national identity 
and a middle class; and thirdly the diffusion of power via multi-party 
electoralism. As we will see, sectarianism introduces complications into 
this formula. 
Sectarianism and state formation appear inversely related, at least in 
the long run: strong states constrain sectarianism and failed states are 
breeding grounds for it. MENA state formation levels, hence the region’s 
vulnerability to trans-state penetration, including sectarianization, has 
varied considerably. Over time it describes a bell shaped curve, rising 
from a period of readily penetrated weak states after independence to a 
peak in the 1980s when authoritarian states were “hardened” against 
such penetration by oil-funded bureaucratic expansion and co-optation, 
thereafter declining through the 1990s and 2000s as resources contracted, 
ending in a new watershed of multiple state failures precipitated by the Arab 
Uprising, which again exposed many of them to trans-state penetration, 
largely by rival sectarian movements, networks and discourse.26 Within 
each time period, too, states varied in their levels of internal consolidation, 
with those having a historical identity congruent with their borders (such 
25  Huntington 1968. 
26  Salloukh 2016; Hinnebusch 2015b; Saouli 2015. 
as Egypt), and/or co-optative patronage from exceptional oil revenues 
(such as Saudi Arabia) better able to resist the post-1980 decline. Stronger 
states are better able to construct identities compatible with statehood 
and to defend their territory from trans-state penetration. Identities tend 
to be constructed against an ’Other’ and it takes a stronger state to direct 
such enmity outward to other states while weak states are vulnerable to 
penetration by rival identities that divide them within and make them 
potential victims of the former. 
On the other hand, sectarianism poses obstacles to state formation. It is 
most difficult where there are several large sectarian groups, as opposed 
to relative homogeneity with small minorities or identity fragmentation 
(with many groups) or where multiple identities cross-cut each other. Most 
dangerous is when there are large minorities excluded from governance by 
a majority or when a minority seems to rule over a majority, as in Iraq and 
Syria. 
This danger is amplified where, as in these states, a counter-balancing 
identification with the state itself was retarded because imperialist-imposed 
borders were incongruent with historic identities, thereby making states 
more vulnerable to competing sub- and supra-state identities, including 
sectarianism. Thus, Lebanon, Syria and Iraq were constructed to suit French 
and British interests, throwing together groups that did not want to share 
a state, cutting them off from kin in neighboring territory and mutilating 
the larger community with which many people identified. In such ‘artificial’ 
states, regime building may drive state building and if the regime fails, the 
state is also put at risk. Yet, even if regime and state overlap, they are not 
identical and their requisites of success can actually contradict each other. 
Given this scenario, what pathways to state building are available in 
such identity-fragmented weak states? In MENA, the dominant regime/
state building practice was (and is) neo-patrimonialism, an authoritarian 
hybrid of personal and bureaucratic authority.27 Personal authority 
prioritizes empowerment of those most loyal to the ruler and in multi-
sectarian societies this typically means those who share a sectarian identity 
with him; this elite core approximates what we mean by the ‘regime.’ 
Bureaucratic authority, which rests on the creation of state institutions – 
civil administration, professional army, legislatures and party systems – 
27  Bank, Richter 2010; Anceschi et al. 2014. 
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is more inclusive since recruitment is by merit and party bureaucracies 
incorporate activists and co-opt constituents. Only cross-class and cross-
sectarian coalitions have the capacity to expand or consolidate state 
power and these require the construction of bureaucratic and political 
institutions able to incorporate such wider social forces. In Huntington’s 
terms, neo-patrimonial regimes use patrimonial practices, including 
sectarianism, in the power concentration phase; as such in the short 
term, at least, sectarianism can be an asset in regime formation, as well as 
problem for state formation. In the power expansion phase, regimes deploy 
bureaucratic inclusionary practices in order to contain the negative side 
of patrimonial practices, which include the alienation of those excluded 
from high office or institutions on ascriptive (identity) grounds and the 
inefficiency introduced into state institutions. The more the bureaucratic 
side constrains the patrimonial one (Egypt), the more rational bureaucracy 
and political inclusion of pro-regime constituencies strengthens the state; 
the more personal authority debilitates the bureaucratic capabilities (e.g. 
Yemen), the less inclusion is possible and the weaker the state. Thus, the 
balance between the relative salience of the two authority practices, and 
specifically, sufficient development of bureaucratic institutions, determines 
the capacity of a given neo-patrimonial regime to include and satisfy actors 
who, if excluded, embrace communal grievances. Sect is, in this process, 
both an asset, particularly for regime-building, yet a potential liability in 
the creation of institutional authority (state-building). 
Different institutional configurations are often explicitly designed to 
deal with identity diversity, and to reconcile the need to create authority 
while also incorporating constituents through some form of political 
participation. MENA’s initially populist versions of authoritarianism 
typically adopted the “assimilationist” approach which seeks the “national 
integration” of social forces through ruling single parties, such as the Ba’th 
party, that recruited across sect and promoted assimilation into a common 
Arab identity while constraining overt sectarian competition. In Syria, 
the Ba’th party’s secular Arab nationalist ideology had some success in 
integrating the Arabic-speaking minorities and in Iraq in bridging Sunni 
Shia gaps with Arabism. However, the subsequent decline of the party 
contracted political inclusion, potentially reviving sectarian grievances 
among the excluded. 
The polar opposite model, consociational democracy, has been attempted 
in a minority of MENA societies where the authoritarian concentration 
of power was obstructed by highly mobilized sectarian communities 
sufficiently balanced in size that power sharing was the only viable state-
building formula. This model not only accommodated identity diversity but 
also institutionalized sectarian differences. In the consociational governance 
prevailing in Lebanon and attempted in post-Saddam Iraq, political 
competition takes place along communal lines with elites mobilizing votes 
through playing on fears of the ‘Other’ and privileging sectarian clients 
with patronage. Consociationalism’s power sharing among confessional 
groups could produce a stable regime if elites refrain from mobilizing 
their sectarian constituencies against each other and from inviting kindred 
external networks to intervene in the internal power competition on their 
behalf. If the system constrains competition by guaranteeing quotas of 
office and patronage to each communal group, sectarianization may be 
muted but if quotas do not fairly represent the demographic weight of 
communal groups, they will themselves become the focus of conflict as in 
Lebanon where this precipitated sectarian civil war in the 1970s. If there is 
a sectarian majority and it becomes permanent, as in Iraq, minorities are 
excluded and will counter-mobilize also on sectarian lines.28 
Thus, neither model appears to be sectarianism-proof and a lot depends 
on the resources regimes can deploy. As noted, state formation in MENA 
followed a bell shaped curve, with economic crises and shrinking resources 
weakening states after the 1980s peak in state strength and debilitating 
their co-optative capacity. Thus, in the 2000s, the Syrian and Iraq regimes 
both became more exclusionary, despite their divergence between neo-
patrimonial authoritarianism in Syria and nominal consociational 
democracy in Iraq. In Syria, Bashar al-Asad’s concentration of power in 
the presidency and the Asad family at the expense of the cross-sectarian 
collective Ba’th party leadership; the neo-liberal policies that aggrandized 
crony capitalists at the expense of the regime’s popular constituency, and the 
debilitation of the party and corporatist organization that penetrated and 
co-opted the regimes initial rural peasant power base – all made his regime 
more vulnerable to anti-regime mobilization. In Iraq the Shia politicians who 
took over power after the American invasion had dismantled the existing 
state, three-quarters of whom had been in exile and therefore lacked Iraqi 
constituencies, turned to anti-Sunni discourse, framed as anti-Ba’thism, as 
the only way to mobilize power bases. Nuri al-Maliki constructed a form of 
electoral neo-patrimonialism that concentrated power in the Shia parties, 
largely excluding or marginalizing Sunnis.29
As regimes’ institutional capacity declined they became more vulnerable 
to sectarian mobilization by opposition forces, dramatically in the Arab 
uprisings. Ruling elites in Syria, Bahrain and Iraq instrumentalized 
sectarianism to turn back this opposition. Yet, this tactic carries high 
risks for instability and, in extreme cases, civil war and this is especially 
so in “artificial” states lacking a state tradition and historical identity: 
there regime formation is almost inseparable from state formation, if the 
regime fails, so does the state. This provides favorable breeding grounds 
for sectarianism, as can be seen in the Levant where state collapse and 
28  Makdisi 1996; Salamy 2009; Salloukh 2015. 
29  Al-Qarawee 2014; Dodge 2014; Hinnebusch 2011. 
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anarchy generated a security dilemma polarizing populations along 
sectarian lines. Once sectarianism seeps down to grass roots, the elites that 
instrumentalized it will find it very hard to put the genie back in the bottle. 
If regimes survive, they tend to be reconfigured as more exclusionary and 
coercive forms of neo-patrimonialism often facing opposing charismatic 
jihadist movements, with both relying on one identity in order to exclude 
others via repression and demonization, as can be seen most clearly in 
Syria. 
In cases of externally-imposed arbitrary borders, notably the post WWI 
“settlement” in the Levant, state failure opens new doors for irredentist 
movements seeking to re-draw them. Borders are more vulnerable where 
they divide compact minorities, such as the Kurds concentrated in the 
Turkey-Syria-Iraq interface or where, as between Syria and Iraq they cut 
across virtually indistinguishable populations. Thus, in Syria and Iraq, 
both the Kurdish PKK/PDY and ISIS mobilizing populations by ethno-
sectarian ideologies are seeking to redraw the borders of Turkey, Syria, and 
Iraq, to overthrow ‘Sykes-Picot,’ and to constitute new more communally 
homogeneous polities, a process that inevitably involves a certain “ethnic 
cleansing.” Whether they succeed depends not just on their relative strength 
compared to state elites and others committed to existing borders, but also 
regional and international permissiveness for border alterations. 
The Impact of Sectarianism on Regime Type: Empowering 
Authoritarianism – Debilitating Democratization
There is a vast literature on the relation between multi-communal societies 
and governance. Early modernization theory expected that sub-state 
identities would, over time, be subsumed in broader national identities 
focused on the state; this, Rustow argued, was needed for democracy 
since, for people to disagree peacefully over issues, they had to share an 
underlying identity commonality.30 In the religious sphere, modernization 
was thought to be accompanied by secularization that would facilitate 
democratization since de-politicization of religious beliefs and religion’s 
removal from the public sphere was necessary to prevent religious conflict 
in multi-confessional societies and the use of religion to legitimize 
authoritarianism. 
Later, “Modernization revisionism,’ reflecting the actual adaptation 
of tradition to modernity, argued that neither ethnicity nor religion 
were effaced by modernization.31 Rather, primordial identities could be 
modernized and become vehicles of modern political participation, e.g. 
30  Rustow 1970. 
31  Gusfield 1967. 
through communal based associations. Nevertheless, trans-national data is 
ambiguous on the impact of sub-state identities on governance. A study by 
Merkel and Weiffen finds failed democratizers having the highest communal 
fractionalization and polarization.32 However, if states survive, moderate 
levels of communal diversity do not necessarily obstruct democratization 
and indeed can facilitate democracy in that it provides opposition with 
a natural social base enabling it to overcome the collective action problem 
and balance ruling groups. 
Religious differences are, however, harder to deal with: cross-national 
statistical studies show that religious heterogeneity increases the chance of 
civil war and decreases the chances of democracy (by 8%) because religion’s 
claims to a single truth are less able to be compromised than conflicts 
involving class and ethnicity.33 Inter-religious sectarian divisions increase 
this tendency. But this anti-democratic effect is highly contingent on the 
kind of sectarianism. Everyday (banal) sectarianism is probably compatible 
with any form of governance and instrumentalized sectarianism is highly 
congruent with consociational democracy. This model, in dividing power 
among social forces, is a barrier to authoritarianism and where sectarian 
groups are politically mobilized and evenly balanced, hence must share 
power, it may be the only viable means of governance.34 But militant 
versions of sectarianism, particularly the jihadism on the rise in the region 
cannot be accommodated by consociational compromises and are, hence, 
obstacles to making such a system work, as can be seen in Iraq where the 
rise of ISIS is both a reaction to the Sunnis’ effective marginalization in 
the consociational political system and an obstacle to Sunni incorporation 
into it.The aftermath of the Arab Uprising provides a new body of evidence 
on sectarianism and governance, although it is ambiguous. On the one 
hand, Lebanon’s relative immunity to spillover of the Syrian civil war 
suggests that consociational power sharing, insofar as a country has been 
immunized by a previous episode of sectarian civil war, gives majorities 
in each community sufficient security that they view the system as worth 
defending against the alternative – a return to civil war. 
But the preponderance of evidence supports the argument that 
sectarianism is a deterrent to democratization and a support for hybrid 
32  Merkel, Wieffen 2012.
33  Gerring et al. 2016. 
34  Andeweg 2000; Kerr 2006: 27-28. 
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and authoritarian regimes. A whole range of techniques have enabled 
authoritarian regimes to use sectarianism to sustain their rule or helped 
ruling elites in hybrid regimes to keep limited electoral competition from 
leading to democratization. Sectarian recruitment of military/security 
forces are normal practices and when regimes are challenged sectarian 
paramilitary networks (e.g., Syrian shabiha and Shia militia in Iraq) have 
been used to repress democracy protests. Co-optation usually accompanies 
repression: thus, it is common for selective economic benefits to be accorded 
to loyal groups, usually the ruler’s own sect (Bahrain, Syria). Common 
also are political practices that strengthen pro-regime sects against rivals 
such as gerrymandering and mal-apportionment in elections (Lebanon, 
Kuwait, Bahrain). Cross-sectarian democratic coalitions are deterred by 
coopting NGOs sharing the ruler’s sect; cracking down on ‘moderate’ 
cross-sectarian NGOs (Lebanon, Bahrain, Kuwait) and banning political 
parties (which might incorporate cross-sectarian support).35 Encouraging 
or tolerating inter-sectarian conflict facilitates divide and rule, as when 
the Saudi and Kuwaiti regimes turn a blind eye to anti-Shia rhetoric by 
Sunni-Islamist groups as a way of binding the majority to the regime and 
controlling the minority.36 Regimes may rally sectarian support by posing 
as protector of minorities against majorities, e.g. Bashar al-Asad posed as 
the protector of minorities against Sunni takfiris; and the al-Khalifa regime 
claimed to protect Sunnis against the Shia majority. Another tactic is to 
delegitimize domestic opponents by painting them as tools of an external 
sectarian power (e.g. the Bahraini regime’s framing of the protesters as an 
Iranian fifth column). An extreme form of sectarian politics is changing 
the sectarian demographic composition of society by giving citizenship 
to foreigners from the regime’s sect and depriving members of opposition 
sects of citizenship, as, notoriously, in Bahrain.
There is, of course, considerable variation in the extent to which sectarianism 
has been deployed by non-democratic regimes. Yet, even in stable relatively 
liberal states such as Kuwait, the monarchy exploits the Sunni-Shia cleavage 
to head off challenges from parliament and society, thus, sustaining 
a hybrid regime against pressures for democratization.37 In Iraq, despite the 
launch under US auspices of a new version of consociational democracy, 
Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki consolidated electoral authoritarianism 
by playing on fears of a Sunni resurgence to create a permanent Shia 
majority bloc while also pursuing exclusionary practices against Sunnis 
and marginalizing cross-sectarian Iraqi nationalist alternatives, such as 
al-Iraqiyya.38 Where regimes are facing outright insurgency, sectarian 
strategies are typically intensified. The monarchy in Bahrain and Syria’s 
35  Gengler 2013. 
36  Louër 2013. 
37  Wells 2016. 
38  Al-Qarawee 2014; Dodge 2014. 
Asad regime each used sectarianism to rally their sectarian bases against 
oppositions, enabling them to beat back democratization demands. 
A number of analysts have argued that “authoritarian learning” has taught 
post-uprising authoritarian regimes the efficacy of sectarian divide and 
rule. The result has been the emergence of ‘hard,’ more exclusivist versions 
of authoritarianism than pre-uprising predecessors.39 The old inclusive 
populist versions of authoritarianism that rested on cross-sectarian 
coalitions cannot be reconstructed once violent sectarianism takes hold; 
rather, uprising states experiencing civil war are spawning more exclusivist, 
perhaps more de-centralized forms of patrimonialism (in which sectarian 
militias govern in local areas, only loosely linked to the authoritarian 
center); on the opposition side, authoritarian charismatic movements 
whose sectarian ideologies demonize the ‘Other’ have proved the most 
effective at recruitment, combat and attracting funding. In Syria, indeed, 
the civil war has created a scenario of competitive authoritarian state 
formation in which a more coercive, exclusivist – if also more decentralized 
– neo-patrimonial Asad regime confronts charismatic jihadist movements 
(Ahrar ash-Sham, Jabhat al-Nusra, ISIS), squeezing out moderate more 
secular, inclusive and pluralist-friendly forces. 
This tendency is reinforced by competitive interference by rival states inside 
states undergoing upheaval: thus in Syria and Iraq, the Sunni regional powers 
and Iran have each sponsored and empowered the most authoritarian and 
coercive sectarian movements, whether Hasht al-Shaabi in Iraq or Ahrar 
al-Sham in Syria. Indeed, both sides tend to support authoritarian oriented 
movements partly because these are more ideologically compatible with 
non-democratic GCC and Iranian governance.40 Moreover, one study 
suggests that the more such external interference in post-Uprising states, 
the more identity conflict, and the less likely is democratization.41
SECTARIANISM AND THE REGIONAL POWER STRUGGLE: 
THE ARAB UPRISING, COMPETITIVE INTERFERENCE AND 
PROXY WARS
The Regional States System
The Middle East state system is defined by a multi-polar material balance 
of power among states embedded in and highly penetrated by a trans-state 
public space defined by identity in which there is an on-going struggle 
39  Stacher 2015; Heydemann, Reinoud 2011; Heydemann 2013; Hashemi 2015. 
40  Stein 2016. 
41  Hinnebusch 2016b.  
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over norms, foreign policy roles and regime legitimacy. The multipolar 
character of the system generates rivalry among states for security and 
hegemony; location tends to shape perceptions of threat from neigbors, 
especially where there are territorial conflicts, encouraging construction of 
the ‘Other’ as a threat, and the identity of the self against the threatening 
other. States power balance against such security threats but the main 
threat to many states is less from armies than internal penetration and 
subversion in which identity is highly instrumentalized by rival powers 
challenging each other’s legitimacy and the main instrument of balancing 
is also promotion of ideology or claims based on identity.42
The power balance among rival states is a function of both their conventional 
power resources (size, population, wealth, armed forces) and levels of 
internal consolidation, which determines their relative vulnerability to 
subversion in legitimacy wars. Thus larger states combining resources such 
as wealth and large populations with cohesive and credible identities (from 
congruence between their borders and a hegemonic identity) tend to be 
stronger, less vulnerable to penetration, and more ambitious to assume 
regional hegemony by promoting claims to leadership of a supra-state 
identity community – historically Pan-Arabism or Pan-Islam. Periodic 
bids for hegemony have been made by Egypt, Iran, Iraq and Saudi Arabia.43 
Smaller, poorer and more identity fragmented states tend to be vulnerable 
to stronger ones and victims of power struggles, unless they can overcome 
(and even exploit) identity fragmentation in order to construct stable 
regimes, as Ba’thist Syria did for several decades. 
Interstate Geopolitical Power Struggles: the Second Arab Cold War
The main watershed event that transformed the identity contests that have 
always been part of MENA inter-state politics into a sectarian war, was 
the outcome of the US invasion of Iraq: the destruction of Ba’thist Iraq 
as a major Arab nationalist power leaving a vacuum filled by Iran whose 
Shia Iraqi clients took power. This greatly alarmed the Arab Sunni Gulf 
monarchies, for whom Iran, contiguous, massive and Shiite, was certain 
to be seen as a threat but which had hitherto been balanced by Arab Iraq. 
The empowering of Iranian-linked Iraqi Shia movements in Iraq further 
deepened the felt threat from Iran among the Arab Gulf and other Arab 
Sunni powers which fought back by instrumentalizing sectarianism.44 This 
resulted in what has been called the “New (or Second) Arab Cold War,” 
which polarized the regional system in the 2000s between two rival camps 
– framed as the pro-Western Moderate Sunni bloc (Saudi Arabia, Egypt, 
Jordan) and the Resistance Axis (Iran, Syria, Hizbollah, Hamas), fighting 
42  Rubin 2014. 
43  Hinnebusch 2013. 
44  Hashemi 2015; Byman 2014; Dodge 2014. 
over sectarian-divided Lebanon and Iraq, and divided over the Israeli 
wars against Hizbollah and Gaza. The Moderate bloc sought to portray 
the issue as Shiite Iran’s interference in the Arab world against Sunnis, 
but the Resistance axis won the war for public opinion in the Arab street 
through the 2000s, owing to its success in portraying itself as the bulwark 
against Israel and American threats to the Arabs and the Sunni powers 
as collaborators (which, in eroding the legitimacy of the Mubarak regime 
made it more vulnerable to the Uprising). The “Resistance Axis” kept the 
upper hand as long as it could overshadow sectarian framing with the 
resistance narrative.45 
The Conduct of the Third Arab Cold War: The Sectarianization of 
Trans-state Identity Wars
The second Arab Cold war was transformed, as a result of the Arab Uprisings, 
into a completely new – the third – struggle for the Middle East, waged 
along quite different lines than in previous decades: Leadership was now 
sought, not of the supra-state community (Arabism or Islam) but of only 
one of the sectarian sides, Sunni or Shia, and was conducted by sectarian 
discourse wars in which the ‘Other’ was widely demonized. When states 
are consolidated, sectarianism is tepid and largely an instrument of state 
rivalry; but what has also changed is that the many failed states issuing 
from the Arab uprising are now uniquely vulnerable, having lost control 
of their borders and/or wracked by civil wars, to a deep penetration of 
their populations by these sectarian identities and to intervention by rival 
outside powers instrumentalizing these identities.
Across the region, sectarian war is being waged by trans-state movements, 
networks and discourse crossing state boundaries, which have their own 
dynamic, autonomous of and “in between” inter-state competition and 
struggles for power inside states – even though rival states helped empower 
this trans-state sectarianism through hosting sectarian preachers and 
satellite TV and funding of sectarian movements. Trans-state sectarian 
discourse, notably the imagery of violence committed by the ‘Other’ 
inflames sectarian animosities which mobilizes activists and puts state 
elites under pressure to defend ‘their’ sect against violence from the ‘Other,’ 
notably via intervention in contested states.46
The autonomy of the trans-state level is evidenced by the fact that 
sectarianization has increased even in states where there is no civil war, 
few sectarian minorities, and not much overt state intervention, driven 
45  Valbjorn, Bank: 2011. 
46  Alloul 2012; Dashti 2013; Lynch 2015. 
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by the trans-state links of sectarian networks and discourse.47 In Egypt, 
where there are few Shiites and little state failure, trans-state links between 
Saudi clerics and Egyptian Salafists have mobilized anti-Shia animosity. 
Salafism, promoted by trans-state preachers, has grown even in relatively 
secular and homogeneous Tunisia where there are few Shia, and a stable 
government exists. That trans-state conflicts can mobilize people even in 
such societies is evidenced by the fact that the highest per-capita number 
of jihadists travelling to Syria have come from Tunisia, an indicator of how 
far the sectarian struggle has become a trans-state phenomenon, building 
on the spread of a Salafism easily mutated into jihadism, but somewhat 
disconnected from internal domestic conditions. 
This is not to say that specific state contexts do not matter; rather, the still 
small total number of Salafists in Tunisia is a function of the country’s 
unique power-sharing between secularists and mainstream Islamists 
(al-Nadha), and the confinement of jihadist recruitment in the most 
marginalized towns is indicative of the fact that the conditions for deep 
grassroots sectarianism, notably state failure, are lacking in Tunisia, the one 
country that has come out of the Arab spring with a working democratic 
system. 
The Arab Uprising and the Regional Power Reshuffle
The Arab Uprising reshuffled the geo-political power balance among 
regional states. The unequal vulnerability of states to the uprising allowed 
some to see it as an opportunity to weaken their rivals. The Uprising led to 
state weakening, even failure, in several states (Syria, Iraq, Libya, Yemen) 
creating power vacuums inviting competitive external intervention 
by more identity cohesive and materially stronger states (Iran, Turkey, 
Saudi Arabia), in which the latter sought to defend or bring to power in 
the Uprising states, clients sharing ideological and specifically, sectarian 
affinity. Syria, in particular became a battleground of rivalry between Iran 
and the Sunni powers, since it was perceived that the outcome of the “new 
Struggle for Syria” would tilt the power balance in favor of one or the other 
of the rival camps. Thus, in the post-Arab uprising period Saudi Arabia, 
Turkey, Qatar and Iran, all intervened with arms, fighters and financial 
aid to governments or insurgents in the identity fragmented and failing 
states in the Levant, Syria above all, but also in the Gulf (Yemen, Bahrain). 
Sectarianism was the main tool of these interventions, with each rival state 
favoring sectarian groups aligned with its own sectarian composition.
Instrumentalizing sectarianism is playing with fire but inside the more 
identity-homogeneous states it tended to reinforce domestic support and 
47  Salloukh 2015. 
enabled them, at acceptable risk, to stir up sectarianism in rival more 
divided states where the damage was concentrated. Thus, the al-Saud’s 
alliance with the Wahhabi religious establishment and the solidarity of its 
Sunni base was reinforced by the identity war with Shiite Iran and the war 
in Yemen it launched in the name of containing the Shia threat. The Yemen 
intervention was also a way of deflecting the challenge to Saudi leadership 
of the Sunni world from ISIS.48 The latter’s attempt, in its attacks on Saudi 
Shia, to enflame sectarian tensions inside the kingdom suggests that the 
sectarianization of the region carries risks even for its main promoters.49 
However, inside identity-divided fragmented states, notably Syria, Iraq, and 
Yemen, the effect of sectarianization was far more damaging, deepening 
and prolonging civil wars and creating anarchy in which the security 
dilemma further divided populations along sectarian lines. Thus, in Yemen 
where sectarian differences hitherto meant little, the regional war launched 
by Saudi Arabia sectarianized the struggle, thereby creating an increasingly 
intractable conflict.50
Each of the main powers in this “Third Arab Cold War” instrumentalized 
sectarianism but strategies differed: Saudi Arabia, newly assertive and 
assuming the leadership of Sunni sectarianism, had a stake in portraying 
Iran as Shia, heretical, non-Arab, hence unentitled to involvement in inter-
Arab politics; thereby it would benefit from the demographic imbalance 
in the Arab world in favor of the Sunnis. Stirring up sectarianism helps 
Saudi Arabia isolate Iran in the Sunni world, particularly important in 
the GCC51 where several emirates have sought to avoid breaking long-
standing ties with Iran. Iran, heading the minority Shia camp, and aware 
its soft power would be debilitated among Sunnis were it to be cast as a 
Shia power, sought to portray itself as the Pan-Islamic leader of a resistance 
axis against the US/Zionist imperialism; on the other hand, Iran had to 
make up for its demographic disadvantage by more mobilized unified Shia 
networks, and, paradoxically, its capacity to assert trans-Shia leadership 
was assisted by sectarian polarization which would push Shia minorities to 
it for protection. Iran also benefited from the greater divisions within the 
nominally Sunni camp (e.g. secularists vs. Islamists, Saudi-Qatari rivalry; 
Turkey vs. Egypt under al-Sisi). 
The regional battle precipitated an unprecedented sectarian bi-polarization 
of state alignments, with all states under pressure to take sides on sectarian 
lines. Alliances formed partly on Sunni-Shia identity grounds, not because 
the contest was about religion, but because it was about ideational power. 
Rival states faced little salient military threat and the contest was chiefly 
waged by via discourse wars, but that made it no less central to their 
48  Matthiesen 2015a/b, 2016. 
49  Matthiesen 2016; Al-Rasheed 2011. 
50  Colgan 2016. 
51  Gulf Cooperation Council (Editor’s note – JVdB). 
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vital interests. States sharing an identity and accompanying legitimizing 
principles aligned against the shared threat from the opposing camp in 
the struggle for regional influence. Not only were spheres of influence at 
stake in the battles over the uprising states, but domestic stability was also 
involved since legitimacy was reinforced when one’s sectarian camp was 
seen to prevail regionally and at risk if the rival camp triumphed. It therefore 
matters which side “wins” in Syria or Yemen, not just for geopolitical gains 
and losses but also for legitimacy, hence stability, at home.52
Bi-polarization has not, of course, wholly effaced other factors in alliance 
formation. For even though some states felt threatened by what they saw 
as Iran’s bid for regional hegemony – notably Israel and Saudi Arabia and 
to a lesser degree, Egypt and Turkey – a solid anti-Iran bloc was prevented 
by variations in identity (between Turkey’s modernist Islam and Saudi 
Wahhabism) and the different location of the main threats to each state 
(Egypt feared Sunni Islamists more than Iran, and Oman was reluctant 
to antagonize Iran). Nevertheless, there was enough anti-Iran balancing 
to check Tehran’s ambitions – indeed Riyadh and Ankara’s sponsorship of 
the anti-Asad uprising kept Iran on the defensive. As such, the two camps’ 
counter-balancing preserved the balance of power.53
Thus, as might be expected in a multi-polar system, no side was able to 
sweep the board, thereby prolonging civil wars. What had changed was 
that, as a result of the Arab Uprising, the participants in the power balance 
have been radically reshuffled as several once-key state players have been 
knocked out of the game by internal sectarian conflict and state failure. 
This has shifted power from the historically central Arab powers, the 
secular Arab nationalist republics of Egypt, Iraq and Syria, which used to 
dominate inter-Arab politics in the name of a more inclusive Pan-Arabism, 
to the standard bearers of religious sectarianism, the newly assertive 
monarchies of the Gulf periphery and the non-Arab states of Turkey, Iran 
(and, although on the sidelines, Israel).54
  CONCLUSION
What began as a variant of the struggle for regional hegemony between 
powers aligned with and against US intervention in Iraq, framed in 
familiar Arab-Islamic terms (resistance to imperialism), was transformed 
by the rival powers’ instrumentalization of sectarianism and the state 
failures unleashed by the Arab uprising into an unprecedented sectarian 
bipolarization of the regional system. Sectarian bi-polarization in the inter-
52  Stein 2016; Gause 2016; Rubin 2014; Salloukh 2016. 
53  Gause 2016; Vakil 2016; POMED 2012; Lynch 2016a/b. 
54  Hinnebusch 2014; 2015a. 
state power struggle was paralleled by a shifting normative balance away 
from moderates within both Shia and Sunni Islam and by polarizations 
splitting several identity-fragmented Arab states apart. 
Sectarian identities in the sectarian-diverse MENA societies were not 
created by these developments; but, hitherto, they remained banal or 
instrumental, not the militant version that excludes sectarian co-existence. 
As long as sectarian identities were cross-cut by class or subsumed by 
state and Pan-Arab identities, sectarianism was contained. As long as 
state-builders balanced their patrimonial instrumentalization of sects 
with more inclusive administrative and party bureaucracies, sectarianism 
actually assisted regime formation and state consolidation. However, once 
neo-patrimonial regimes became more patrimonialized and less inclusive, 
states were vulnerable to sectarian grievances and potential revolt. The 
destruction of the Iraqi state, setting off a wave of sectarian consciousness 
across the region and setting up the regional power struggle between Iran 
and Saudi Arabia, in which they instrumentalized sectarianism, further 
prepared the ground for sectarianization. Yet the limited resonance of their 
discourse on the Arab street throughout the 2000s and the remarkable 
durability and resilience of neo-patrimonial regimes – it took a US invasion 
to topple Saddam Hussein – make it unlikely sectarianism would have 
widely destabilized regimes or reached the grassroots without the power 
struggles unleashed by the Arab Uprisings.  
Sectarianization was initiated by its instrumentalization in both the 
domestic power struggles unleashed in states experiencing uprisings and 
in the competitive interference in uprising states by rival regional powers, 
but the resonance of sectarian discourses at the grass roots level depended 
on state failure, escalation of violence, and the security dilemma in the 
Uprising states; in turn, this was reinforced by the support of external 
powers for the most radical sectarian fighters and their financing of a war 
economy that kept the violence going and deepened the security dilemma.
That the dominant identities used in the regional power struggle have 
changed from supra-state ones to sectarianism matters profoundly for the 
conduct of politics: thus, the dominance of Arabism had contributed to 
the integration of Arabic speaking minorities within states and enjoined 
the Arab states to cooperate at the regional level. Although competition 
for Arab leadership often led to conflict among them over the proper 
interpretation of Arabism, these could be more readily compromised than 
the current cleavages: indeed, the current version of radical sectarianism 
prescribes uncompromising jihad within the Islamic umma against heresy. 
It has split societies wide open, and helped created a slew of failed states 
in which jihadists find fertile ground to freely operate across borders, 
challenging the states system. The democratization impetus of the Arab 
uprising was stopped in its tracks and harder, more exclusionary sectarian-
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based versions of neo-patrimonial and charismatic jihadist movements 
were empowered. In this Sunni-Shia bi-polarization of the region all people 
and states are pushed to take sides. This intensified power struggle waged 
by sectarian discourse and proxy wars is plunging the Middle East into 
a new dark age. 
What does the future hold? A cessation in the instrumentalization of 
sectarianism by rival regional powers and a ceasefire, hence increased 
security and a return to normal economy in states afflicted by civil war – 
Syria, Iraq, Yemen, Libya – could reverse the reproduction of grass roots 
sectarianization. An end to fighting in Syria, in some ways the epicenter of 
the sectarian war, could marginalize the militants and empower moderates; 
indeed, there was evidence of this in the first (Spring 2016) cease-fire in Syria 
when civil activists re-emerged and the jihadist Jabhat al-Nusra suffered 
a backlash against its hardline puritanism and takfirism. Were the flow of 
resources (provided as part of regional proxy war) to warring parties to be 
halted, warlords profiting from conflict would be weakened and those still 
hoping for victory if only their patrons would increase support for them 
would have to accept that a hurting stalemate had been reached that could 
only be resolved through compromise and power-sharing. Indeed, at the 
regional level, already some of the actors promoting jihadism in Syria, such 
as Qatar and to a degree Turkey, have been forced to bend to the backlash 
at both the regional and international levels. 
Yet even were ceasefires to be reached, the sectarian animosity and distrust 
created by years of killing would likely be an intractable obstacle to the 
power-sharing needed to create enough stability to overcome the security 
dilemma in failed states. Whole new generations grown up under civil war 
have adopted sectarian identities and rival politicians would not be likely 
to resist the temptation to use sectarianism to mobilize support.55 The 
settlement of the Lebanese civil war demonstrates that such obstacles can 
be overcome; but a condition in the Lebanese case – the existence of third 
parties (Syria and Saudi Arabia at Taif) sponsoring and imposing an end to 
the fighting – seems to be absent in the current Arab civil wars; only if the 
great powers combined to enforce an end to the fighting, would this have 
a chance of happening and even then it is questionable whether they have 
sufficient leverage over the regional and internal players. Moreover, the great 
powers themselves are starting to use MENA conflicts, notably in Syria, to 
fight their own proxy wars. The reality is that there are too many “spoilers” 
to make a settlement of the Arab civil wars easy or likely anytime soon. And 
without an end to these proxy wars, sectarianization cannot be reversed. 
  
55  Lynch 2016a, 2016b
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